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Abstract: This Trends article discusses the possibility of meaningful analysis pertaining to the possibility 
of terrorist threats against nuclear installations. 
 
“The threat of terrorism cannot be considered when licensing reactors or other nuclear installations 
because the risk is too speculative.” 
 
This provocative quote is taken from a New York Times article and is presented as a paraphrase of the 
United States’ Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) position towards licensing Issues concerning 
several proposals concerning nuclear installations. At Issue is not the accuracy of the Times paraphrase, 
but instead the logic of the paraphrase as belief. 
 
The paraphrase may be taken to intimate that terrorist threat against a specific installation cannot be 
quantified in any meaningful way. This quantification problem may, indeed, be significant. To jettison a 
terrorism calculus of some kind because quantification is problematic may, however, be even more 
problematic. It is as if the problem is not with an analytic approach but with some real world problem 
that refuses to conform to the requirements of the analytic approach. 
 
The paraphrase also may be taken to intimate that terrorism is just so unlikely that it should not be part 
of a calculus addressing the potential threat of a nuclear installation towards the environment. One 
interesting aspect of this interpretation is that--in essence--some acceptable quantification has occurred 
and yields the result of some probability too small to warrant the attention of assessors of 
environmental damage. 
 
The paraphrase also may be taken to direct assessors of threat to take general terrorism-related 
precautions even if quantifications is not meaningful. However, this interpretation contains a non-
sequitur. Without some quantitative stance--even if only using an ordinal scale that can be phrased 
qualitatively--general precautions cannot be taken as to answering questions such as how much and 
what kind. 
 
Regardless of the accuracy of the Times report, one should agree that threat assessment for nuclear 
installations should address terrorism and can be done in a meaningful fashion. (See Rasmussen, J. 
(1993). Learning from experience? How? Some research Issues in industrial risk management. In B. 
Wilpert & T. U. Qvale (Eds.). Reliability and safety in hazardous work systems: Approaches to analysis 
and design. (pp. 43-66). Erlbaum; Umbers, I. G., & Reiersen, C. S. (1995). Task analysis in support of the 
design and development of a nuclear power plant safety system. Ergonomics, 38, 443-454; Wald, M. 
(January 7, 2003). N.R.C. excludes terrorism as licensing consideration. The New York Times, A11; 
Wardlaw, G. (1983). Psychology and the resolution of terrorist incidents. Australian Psychologist, 18, 
179-190.) (Keywords: Nuclear Installations, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Terrorism.) 
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